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It has been claimed that many workers in modern economies think that their job is socially 
useless, i.e. that it makes no or a negative contribution to society. However, the evidence so 
far is mainly anecdotal. We use a representative dataset comprising 100,000 workers from 
47 countries at four points in time. We find that approximately 8% of workers perceive 
their job as socially useless, while another 17% are doubtful about the usefulness of their 
job. There are sizeable differences between countries, sectors, occupations, and age groups, 
but no trend over time. A vast majority of workers cares about holding a socially useful job 
and we find that they suffer when they consider their job useless. We also explore possible 
causes of socially useless jobs, including bad management, strict job protection legislation, 
harmful economic activities, labor hoarding, and division of labor. 
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1. Introduction 
In a widely read essay, anthropologist David Graeber (2013) has claimed on the basis of 
anecdotal evidence that “Huge swathes of people, in Europe and North America in 
particular, spend their entire working lives performing tasks they secretly believe do not 
really need to be performed.” (see also Graeber 2018). This claim, if true, is worrisome 
for at least three reasons. First, in as far as workers’ beliefs reflect the true usefulness of 
their job, it would mean a huge waste of resources. Second, experimental studies (Ariely 
et al. 2008, Grant 2008, Carpenter and Gong 2016, Kosfeld et al. 2017) have shown that 
motivation and, hence, productivity deteriorate when workers consider their job as useless 
or harmful, which is problematic when jobs are actually useful. Third, and independent 
of the true usefulness of the job, job satisfaction and well-being will be lower for those 
workers who care about doing a useful job, but perceive their job as useless. 
This paper studies socially useless jobs using a large representative dataset – the 
International Social Survey Program, Work Orientations Waves – covering more than 
100,000 workers from 47 countries in 1989, 1997, 2005, and 2015. We address the 
following issues: How many workers consider their job as socially useless? How does 
this differ between countries, sectors, occupations, cohorts, age groups, and over time? 
Do workers suffer when they perceive their job as useless? What explains the existence 
of socially useless jobs? And, finally, what can be done about it? 
Our study is limited to workers’ subjective assessment of the social usefulness of their 
job, which we measure by workers’ response to the statement "My job is useful to 
society". Ideally, we would also consider the true usefulness of jobs, as well as its relation 
with workers’ perceptions. However, objective measures are hard to find (cf. Lockwood 
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et al. 2017) or may not even exist (Graeber 2013). As a result, we will not be able to speak 
to the issue of whether there is a substantial waste of human resources. We are, however, 
in a good position to speak to the other major issues mentioned above – workers’ 
motivation, productivity, and satisfaction – as these are affected by the workers’ 
perceived social impact, not by the true social impact of their work. 
Our focus on the social usefulness of jobs differs from Dekker (2018), who – 
independently from and concurrently with the present study – examined the responses of 
workers to the more general question “I doubt the importance of my work” using the 
European Working Conditions Survey 2015. Likewise, Hu and Hirsh (2017) use a 
composite measure of ‘meaningful work’, which includes whether the job is interesting 
and whether one can help other people on the job.1 Closer to our definition, YouGov 
surveyed a sample of workers in the UK in 2015 asking whether their job is making a 
meaningful contribution to the world, finding a higher percentage of workers who 
disagree than we do.2 
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we will examine workers’ 
perceptions of the social usefulness of their jobs and how they differ across and within 
countries and over time. Section 3 studies workers’ desire for a socially useful job and 
the consequences of holding a socially useless job for job satisfaction, the pride workers 
take in their job, and workers’ job search behavior. Section 4 turns to possible 
explanations for the existence of socially useless jobs. We explore the role of bad 
                                                          
1 See also Steger et al. (2012) for an extensive description of several dimensions of 
meaningful work and Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2018) for an analysis of how 
meaningful US workers find their work. 
2 See: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/08/12/british-jobs-meaningless/. 
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management, strict job protection legislation, harmful economic activities, labor 
hoarding, and division of labor. Section 5 concludes with a brief summary and a 
discussion of what governments, employers, and workers can do to prevent that socially 
useless jobs emerge or persist. 
 
2. Who consider their job as socially useless? 
We assume a worker considers his job as socially useless when he disagrees or strongly 
disagrees with the statement "My job is useful to society". Using this classification, we 
find for the sample of workers in the 2015-wave – which includes more than 27,000 
workers in 37 countries – that 8% perceive their job as socially useless. In contrast, close 
to 75% of workers agrees or strongly agrees with the statement. The remaining 17% 
neither agrees nor disagrees, and so they seem doubtful about the usefulness of their job.3 
Figure 1 shows considerable differences between countries in the percentage of workers 
perceiving their job as socially useless, with relatively high shares in countries such as 
Poland, Japan, Israel, and India, and relatively low shares in Norway, Switzerland, and 
Mexico. There is some variation over time in the share of socially useless jobs, but no 
clear time trend: it moves from 6% in 1989, to 10% in 1997, back to 6% in 2005.4 The 
pattern over time mirrors the business cycle, with lower shares during booms and higher 
shares during recessions, an issue we will return to in Section 4 where we examine 
possible explanations for socially useless jobs.  
                                                          
3 Respondents could also choose “Can’t choose”, which was chosen by slightly more 
than 1%.  
4 Countries included in the sample vary from wave to wave, but correcting for this does 
not change the pattern over time in an important way, see Table S1 in the Appendix. 
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Table 1 reports the results of regressing whether a worker considers her job as socially 
useless on sector of employment, whether one holds a management position, and a set of 
demographic characteristics.5 In line with a rich literature in public administration and 
economics (Perry and Vandenabelee 2015, Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008, Besley and 
Ghatak 2018), we find that workers in the public sector are much less likely to report 
having a socially useless job than workers in the private sector (more than 6 percentage 
points lower, which is large compared to the average of 8% in the full sample). Further 
inspection of the data shows that this holds particularly for occupations such as 
firefighters, police officers, social benefits officials, health workers, and teachers. For 
                                                          
5 Throughout this paper we use OLS regression models for ease of interpretation; 
logistic regressions give similar results. 
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these occupations, we find that the percentage of workers reporting socially useless work 
is close to or equal to zero, see Table S2 in the Appendix. In contrast, for government 
clerks and the armed forces we find percentages closer to the sample average. Regarding 
the demographic variables, we find no significant gender difference and a weak, but 
statistically significant, negative relation with years of education. In contrast to what is 
sometimes thought (Graeber 2013), managers are not more likely to report socially 
useless work than regular workers, and this holds for both middle managers and top 
managers. Lastly, we find sizeable associations with cohort and age, see the coefficients 
plotted in Figure 2. Holding age constant, cohorts born before World War II are less likely 
to perceive their job as socially useless, particularly the cohort born before 1921.6 Holding 
constant the cohort, older workers are much less likely to perceive their job as socially 
useless. This age-pattern may arise for a variety of reasons including ‘job shopping’ by 
young workers in search for a meaningful job and early retirement by old workers who 
consider their job socially useless.  
 
                                                          
6 When interpreting these coefficients, it is important to keep in mind that the regression 
in Table 1 does not include time fixed effects, because of the linear dependency of age, 
cohort, and time effects.  
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3. Do workers suffer when they perceive their job as useless? 
Having a job that is useful to society is considered an important job characteristic by a 
vast majority of workers: Table 2 shows that close to 77% of the 2015-wave finds this 
important or very important. Not all of these workers manage to get a job they consider 
socially useful. Fifty percent of socially useless jobs are occupied by workers who find it 
important to have a socially useful job. However, the data do suggest that there is some 
sorting of workers to jobs on the basis of preferences, as workers who do not care about 
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the usefulness of their job are clearly overrepresented among those who perceive their job 
as socially useless. We find similar results for the other waves. 
 
Workers who care about holding a socially useful job report lower job satisfaction when 
they perceive their job as useless. In the first column of Table 3, we regress a worker’s 
job satisfaction (measured on a 7-point scale) on whether she holds a socially useless job, 
whether she cares about holding a socially useless job, and the interaction between these 
two variables. We also include a set of demographic characteristics (age, gender, and 
education) and country fixed effects.7 We find a strong negative relation between holding 
a socially useless job and job satisfaction for those who care, while the relationship is 
much weaker for those who indicate not to care about holding a socially useless job.8  
                                                          
7 Table S3 in the Appendix provides a version of Table 3 that also reports the 
coefficients for the demographic characteristics. The coefficients for the country fixed 
effects are available upon request. 
8 Both the dependent and the main independent variable in the regressions in Table 3 
and 4 are respondent’s subjective assessments, which may give rise to biases, for 
instance due to omitted variables such as the respondent’s personality and mood. While 
this argument may have some merit, we believe it is not quite so compelling here, 
because the worker’s assessment of the usefulness of his job (the main independent 
variable) is not so much a statement about his overall feeling of happiness with work. 
We thank a reviewer for bringing up this point. 
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In the second column, we add a range of other job characteristics as controls, resulting in 
a slightly weaker – but still highly significant – relationship between holding a socially 
useless job and job satisfaction for those who care.9 The drop in the coefficient reflects 
that workers who hold a socially useless job oftentimes also report that other job 
characteristics are less attractive, such as a lack of opportunities for advancement and job 
insecurity. Not including these as controls leads to a bias away from zero in the coefficient 
of main interest.  
In the final column of Table 3, we add as a control the workers’ wage, which is measured 
in country-specific intervals. If the theory of compensating wage differentials (Rosen 
1974) holds, then we expect that socially useless jobs pay higher wages to compensate 
for the disamenity. Not controlling for wages in the job satisfaction regression then biases 
                                                          
9 Table S3 in the Appendix provides a description of the job characteristics we control 
for and the resulting regression coefficients. 
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the estimate of the true nonpecuniary loss of holding a socially useless job toward zero. 
However, we find that the estimate hardly changes, suggesting that workers holding a 
socially useless job are not financially compensated for this disamenity. The estimated 
coefficient implies that, for those who care, holding a socially useless job is associated 
with a drop in job satisfaction by 45% of a standard deviation, which is comparable to the 
association of job satisfaction with other important job characteristics, such as job 
security, opportunities for advancement, and being able to work independently, see the 
first column in Table 4.  
We ran the same regressions for other important outcome variables, and find results in 
line with those for job satisfaction, see the second, third, and fourth column in Table 4. 
Workers who hold a socially useless job and care about this feel less proud of the type of 
work they do. They are significantly more likely to indicate that, given the chance, they 
would change their type of work. Likewise, they find it more likely that they will try to 
find another job within the next 12 months.10  
                                                          
10 Earlier research has found that workers who find their job useless more likely suffer 
from emotional exhaustion, a distinctive feature of burnout (Grant and Sonnentag 
2010). 
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4. What explains the existence of socially useless jobs? 
What might explain that about 8% of workers perceive their job as socially useless? We 
can think of five plausible reasons, for which we provide tentative empirical evidence in 
what follows.  
First, it has been widely recognized that some economic activities harm rather than help 
people. Think, for instance, of firms that exploit our psychological weaknesses and 
ignorance to make us buy products that we actually do not need or that harm us (Akerlof 
and Shiller 2015, Thaler 2018). As a concrete example, it has been argued that financial 
advice by bankers and insurance agents can be “a curse rather than a blessing” for 
consumers (Inderst and Ottaviani 2012). Similarly, workers in so-called ‘sin industries’ 
such as the tobacco industry and gambling and those involved in rent-seeking and 
lobbying may not be convinced that they make a positive contribution to society (Murphy 
et al. 1991 and Brun et al. 2017).  
Our data provide some support for this explanation. Indeed, among the top-20 
occupations with the highest share of workers reporting a socially useless job, we find 
“sales, marketing, and public relations professionals,” “finance managers,” and “sales and 
purchasing agents and brokers” (which include insurance representatives) scoring 
percentages higher than 14%, see Table S4. This is in line with the empirical evidence in 
Lockwood et al. (2017) – reporting negative economy-wide externalities for jobs in 
finance and law – and in Ashraf and Bandiera (2017) – reporting particularly low values 
of perceived social impact of bankers engaged in marketing and legal offices, finance, 
and investment banking. Interestingly, also economists make it into the top-20. For 
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workers in ‘sin industries’ such as the tobacco industry and gambling, we unfortunately 
lack a sufficient number of observations. 
A second explanation relies on Marx's theory of alienation (Marx 1844), which argues, 
among others, that division of labor into highly specialized parts can make meaningful 
work look meaningless. We find some support for this idea in our data. In the top-20 
occupations with the highest share of workers reporting to have a socially useless job, we 
find three occupations for which Marx’s theory may be particularly relevant: “Stationary 
plant and machine operators,” “Assemblers,” and “Labourers in mining, construction, 
manufacturing, and transport performing simple and routine manual tasks” with 
percentages close to 14%, see Table S4. 
The third explanation relies on the fact that decisions on job creation and job destruction 
are typically taken by managers. If managers do a bad job, socially useless jobs may 
emerge or persist. We use data from Bloom et al. (2014) about the average quality of 
management in the manufacturing industry for 14 countries and find no support for this 
prediction: management quality is not negatively associated with the share of socially 
useless jobs among workers (see Figure 3). We find a similar result when replacing the 
average quality of management by the percentage of companies that is badly managed. 
Unfortunately, we lack data on management quality for more countries and other 
industries. 
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Our fourth explanation is that strict job protection legislation may force organizations into 
retaining workers, even when work has disappeared (e.g. due to technological shocks or 
changing market circumstances), leaving workers with little to do on the job. Using data 
from the OECD about job protection legislation in 31 different countries for several years, 
we find no evidence for this prediction: job protection does not correlate significantly 
with the share of socially useless jobs, see Figure 4.  
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Our fifth and last explanation is labor hoarding, i.e. the tendency of organizations to hold 
on more workers than necessary during economic downturns in anticipation of better 
times, resulting in “on-the-job underemployment” (Okun 1962). Using data from the 
OECD on the economies’ output gap in 27 countries for several years, we find some 
support for this idea: the share of socially useless jobs is significantly higher when the 
economic situation gets worse (a one standard deviation increase in the output gap is 
associated with a 0.5 percentage points increase in the share of socially useless jobs; see 
Figure 5). However, it also appears clearly from the data that socially useless jobs are not 
merely observed during recessions.  
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5. Concluding remarks 
We have found that about 8% of workers consider their job as socially useless. An 
additional 17% seems doubtful about the social usefulness of their job. While these 
numbers are much lower than has been suggested on the basis of anecdotal evidence in 
Graeber (2013, 2018), the share of workers perceiving their job as socially useless is 
clearly not negligible either. In line with earlier studies in public administration and 
economics, we found a big difference between workers in the public sector and workers 
in business, with 11% of the latter considering their job as socially useless, while only 
3% of public sector workers think about their job in that way. Within business, the share 
of workers considering their job as socially useless is particularly high in jobs involving 
simple and routine tasks as well as jobs in finance, sales, marketing, and public relations. 
Within the public sector, jobs in education, health, and the police force are rarely 
perceived as socially useless. Further, we have seen that managers and workers do not 
differ much in how they evaluate the usefulness of their job, in contrast to what is 
sometimes thought. Of the potential causes of socially useless jobs, we found some 
evidence consistent with the ideas that division of labor, labor hoarding, and harmful 
economic activities may be partly responsible for the existence of socially useless work. 
We found no evidence for the hypotheses that bad managers and strict job protection 
legislation give rise to socially useless jobs. However, we cannot draw firm conclusions, 
as our analysis is correlational in nature.  
What can be done to reduce socially useless jobs? We see a role for governments, 
employers, and workers. Governments may use taxation to discourage employers to 
create or retain pointless and harmful jobs and encourage them to create socially useful 
18 
 
jobs, an idea recently explored in Lockwood et al. (2017). Stricter regulation of harmful 
economic activities (e.g. through consumer protection laws) may, of course, also 
contribute to reducing the number of socially useless jobs. Moreover, even though our 
preliminary evidence does not convincingly point in this direction, it seems wise to avoid 
unnecessarily strict job protection legislation. Employers can help by removing or 
improving bad management (although our tentative empirical evidence on this does not 
suggest that management quality plays a big role). When the social uselessness of jobs is 
a matter of perception rather than reality, employers may use nudging or adapt job design. 
Lastly, Valcour (2013) and Coleman (2017) suggest a role for workers as well in making 
their job more meaningful. 
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Dependent variable:
Socially useless job (SUJ) -0.77*** -0.52*** -0.52***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Don’t mind having a SUJ -0.22*** -0.14*** -0.15***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Don't mind having a SUJ * SUJ 0.40*** 0.27*** 0.28***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Female -0.05*** -0.03*** 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age group: < 21 0.07 0.01 0.09*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Age group: 21 - 30 -0.06*** -0.12*** -0.09***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age group: 31 - 40 0.02 -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age group: 41 - 50 reference reference reference
Age group: 51 - 60 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age group: 61 - 70 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.22***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age group: > 70 0.35*** 0.25*** 0.31***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Years of education -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0013**
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Other job characteristics: 
          My job is secure 0.40*** 0.38***
(0.01) (0.02)
          My opportunities for advancement are high 0.43*** 0.40***
(0.02) 0.02
          I can work independently 0.37*** 0.35***
(0.02) (0.02)
          I often have to do hard physcial work -0.16*** -0.11***
(0.01) (0.02)
          I often find my work stressful -0.33*** -0.36***
(0.01) (0.01)
Wage dummies per countries No No Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26,184 26,184 26,184
R2 0.09 0.21 0.29
Table S3. Socially useless jobs and job satisfaction in 2015
Job satisfaction is measured using a 7-point scale; a higher value means more satisfied. The mean is 
5.32 and the standard deviation is 1.17. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
 Job satisfaction
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